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Abstract:  
This article explores the relationship between the Air Ministry and the British airframe 
industry in the 1920s and the efforts undertaken to increase the capacity of the industry to 
increase output in the event of a national emergency. It charts the negotiations between the 
Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC) and Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton in 
1925. It argues that the Air Ministry were looking at the strategic problems that would be 
faced if the industry was not able to increase production while the SBAC were only 
concerned with their survival and looked toexploit the Air Ministry’s concerns. 
The Royal Air Force (RAF) ended the First World War with the largest air force then known 
to the world. The 1920s, however, was a period of retrenchment, defence and consolidation 
for the fledgling independent force, and this would have disastrous consequences for the 
aviation industry that had developed as a result of war demand. The global strategic outlook, 
based as it still was around European rather than American power, was one of relative peace 
and this allowed the governments of the 1920s to reduce spending on defence and concentrate 
on domestic social programmes.2 Investigations were undertaken by the Air Ministry to 
establish the capacity of the aviation industry in Britain and how best it could be prepared to 
upscale its production in the event of an emergency and during the initial phase of a state of 
war. Peter Fearon has claimed that ‘there is no evidence of a detailed questionnaire being sent 
out or of consultations with the SBAC [Society of British Aircraft Constructors] …’ as a part 
of this process.3 It quickly became clear that the aviation industry in Britain simply did not 
have the capacity or capability to increase production in an emergency. This article will 
demonstrate this by looking at the investigations of Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton who 
worked closely with the industry body the SBAC during 1925.  
Due to limitations of space it will not look at activity within the aero-engine industry but will 
focus on the relationship between the SBAC and the Air Ministry. It will not look at 
individual firms as they negotiated en masse through the SBAC, who would discuss issues 
with the Air Ministry as they arose and where they affected all or a majority of their 
members. It will argue that the Air Ministry attempted to increase the manufacturing ability 
of the aviation industry in Britain to meet a future emergency when quantity production 
would be required. Charlton was prevented in this attempt by the SBAC who simply looked 
at how it would affect individual constructors rather than a national effort. Whilst it is 
understandable for the industry body to protect the survival of individual members as viable 
businesses, the Air Ministry attempted to increase the viability of many manufacturers by 
improving their production capabilities. The only credible counter argument that the SBAC 
offered that stands up to any interrogation is the potential effect such a move by the Air 
Ministry would have on the design teams in major firms if work was taken from them and 
sub-contracted out to others. 
This paper will also highlight an understudied aspect of the history of the aviation industry in 
Britain. The focus of historians has been the unpreparedness of the both the Air Ministry and 
aviation industry for expansion in the 1930s, in response to policy decision made by both 
Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain.4 This article will demonstrate that the Air 
Ministry had a degree of knowledge of the required scope for the aviation industry to increase 
its production capacity. There would be a remarkable shift in priorities after the Second 
World War when the prospect of nuclear war meant that there would be little need for large-
scale mass production capacity.5 The increasing cost and technological complexity of aircraft 
production meant that future designs would require international collaboration, something 
that continues to this day thereby negating even further the requirement for manufacturers to 
have spare capacity in the case of emergency. The continual advancement of technology in 
aircraft production, that often renders aircraft obsolescent before they leave the production 
line and remains one of the biggest issues that plagues the procurement of new aircraft in the 
contemporary environment. It further highlights the difficulties faced meeting the challenge 
of contingency planning in an age of austerity. 
Defence spending in Britain was reduced in line with the thinking of the Ten Year Rule, 
instituted in 1919.6 Restrictions on defence spending would be a concurrent theme during the 
majority of the RAF’s existence. Whilst there has been much debate between historians 
regarding the overall impact of the Ten Year Rule, it is outside the scope of this paper to 
discuss this in depth; suffice to say that it led to decreased budgets for the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) three military Services.7 This was one of the most difficult times for the RAF since its 
creation in 1918, having to defend itself as an independent Service and demonstrate its 
relevance in the wider strategic environment. This is something that the RAF has had to do in 
order to justify its continued existence. Despite Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, (Chief of 
the Air Staff) wishing to spend the majority of the meagre budget (this fell to £9.4 million in 
1923) given to the RAF on constructing physical infrastructure leading to a specific air force 
culture being developed, new aircraft were still required, and old aircraft would require 
reconditioning to remain serviceable.8 This need for new aircraft was heightened after the 
deterioration in relations between the UK and France over Germany’s refusal to pay the 
Versailles Treaty reparations and the subsequent French invasion of the Ruhr valley in an 
attempt to extract payment in goods.9 It was realised, after the diplomatic crisis between 
London and Paris in the wake of the Ruhr invasion, that the French Air Force vastly 
outnumbered the RAF and could unleash untold damage on major cities without the fear of 
massive retaliation to deter them.10  Whilst there was little fear of French attack from the 
Chiefs of Staff, this feeling was not shared by the politicians, it was this fear that led to plans 
for an expansion of the RAF being made.11  
 
 
It had been decided by the British government prior to the First World War that it would not 
create public factories for the construction of aircraft or aero-engines. It would, instead, rely 
on private industry to supply their requirements. This was despite the financially precarious 
nature of the majority of British aircraft constructors at this time.12 There was, initially, 
relatively heavy investment in the Royal Aircraft Factory (formerly the Royal Balloon 
Factory) as a research and design hub that, under its flamboyant director, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Mervyn O’Gorman, also began to build aircraft. Whilst O’Gorman did not see this as 
impinging on the burgeoning private constructors, this was not how the industry saw the 
Royal Aircraft Factory and there was a level of distrust between the government began to 
sour relations, who as effectively the sole customer of the industry felt it could arrange 
production as it wished, and the industry itself who wanted to retain a degree of independence 
in their affairs.13 As Harald Penrose has noted ‘O’Gorman had no intention of competing 
with the British manufacturers, for as an imaginative, energetic, and intellectual leader he was 
as convinced of the value of private enterprise as any man.’14 The research that emerged from 
the Royal Aircraft Factory would have been of invaluable use to the private constructors, but 
they were keener to find solutions by trial and error rather than via scientific methods.15  
As the First World War progressed, the demand for aircraft and aero-engines increased 
exponentially. This led the pioneering private constructors to expand in size to meet the 
demand and new firms entered the market as it became clear that current capacity was not 
enough. In terms of aero-engines, there was very little expansion in domestic production and, 
the majority of aero-engines were of French manufacture. From 1918, the RAF realised that 
such reliance had to be avoided if another major conflict was to break out.16 The aviation 
industry as whole expanded to meet the wartime demand as best they could, but inevitably 
demand outstripped industrial capacity to supply and delays were experienced. This issue was 
not aided by the competing demands of the War Office and Admiralty for aircraft from the 
same suppliers and the centralisation of all aircraft procurement to prioritise requirements and 
delivery was one of the reasons noted for the creation of an independent air force in 
discussions that took place between 1917 and 1918.17 
With the end of the First World War and the natural decline in the quantity of orders for 
aircraft and aero-engines, many manufacturers found life difficult and struggled to survive. 
This was particularly the case when the Excess Profits Tax initiated in 1915 was continued 
until 1920 by the post-war government of David Lloyd George.18 The Excess Profits Tax was 
designed as a quell to public opinion that armament manufacturers had been able to profit 
excessively from war production.19 Many firms, particularly within the aviation industry, did 
not have the necessary capital to meet this continuing tax burden. The Air Ministry was fully 
aware that, with the declining viability of firms and the subsequent reduced industrial base 
they would be unable to re-equip the RAF force quickly in the event of a diplomatic 
emergency or war with another industrialised nation. It was not until late in 1924, however, 
that this was formally accepted by the Air Ministry and a scheme designed to plan for this 
eventuality. Lieutenant-Colonel H.W.S. Outram wrote in a loose minute to Charlton that he 
saw three stages of expansion necessary for achieving greater production in an emergency. 
These stages were ‘The expansion to a maximum output of the firms engaged on aeronautical 
supplies in peace-time’; followed by ‘The formation of those firms into Master Firms’; and 
finally, ‘The formation of National Aircraft Factories’.20  
Outram expected that under the first stage production could be expected to double within a 
month of the emergency. This was followed by the proviso that sufficient raw materials and 
sundry items such as instruments must be available, orders had to be distributed to a large 
number of firms, that adequate space existed at the firms and that the industry had the ability 
to produce the designs of other firms.21 These were similar provisos to those that would be 
faced during the rearmament of the 1930s, where firms could not justify the investment in 
extra factory floor space simply for a short-lived rise in demand.22  
Ensuring firms had the necessary stock of raw materials, with the investment in capital, to be 
able to react to an emergency would be a tough sell for the Air Ministry. The firms would not 
want to sink money into extra stock that would degrade over time for an emergency that may 
or may not materialise. In order to resolve this issue, the firms, through the SBAC, suggested 
that the Air Ministry should purchase the stock that would be held at the aircraft 
manufacturers on a ‘pay on consumption basis’.23 This alleviated all the financial risk to the 
firms and placed it all on the Air Ministry and, as a result, the tax payer. The SBAC claimed 
that holding this emergency stock would create increased costs involved in assessing and 
turning the timber stock to prevent degradation that would also fall to the Air Ministry. The 
firms of the SBAC were willing to accept this cost as they already had staff employed in this 
role and so would only have to accept a negligible cost to ensure the quality of the timber. 
This is a major example of the SBAC looking to exploit the fears of both the government of 
the day and the Air Ministry over the industry’s ability to upscale its production to either save 
or make money. By holding the stock on site on a ‘pay on consumption’ basis and having the 
Air Ministry re-stock any timber used, they would only have to pay for what was consumed 
and not have invested capital into excessive stock that may lie unused, appearing as a 
negative on their balance sheets.  
These were not the only aspects to be considered by the Air Ministry or the industry. In order 
to allow the firms the opportunity to train and retain the necessary skeleton production staff, 
they would require orders over a long period of time. The SBAC were of the opinion that a 
substantial number of orders over a three- to five-year period would suffice.24 Whilst, on the 
surface, this may seem like a reasonable request from the industry’s body, it must be taken 
within its historical context where the budgets available for new aircraft were severely 
limited. New aircraft could not be ordered simply to keep firms in business and the Air 
Ministry recognised this when they established the ring of aircraft constructors to whom they 
would farm out enough production and reconditioning contracts to keep the firms in business. 
With the priority of Trenchard being on physical infrastructure for the RAF and not the 
continual purchase of aircraft, there was little that the Air Member for Supply and Research 
(AMSR) or the Principle Supply Officer (PSO) could do.  
In an attempt to get around this situation Charlton as PSO suggested that ten per cent of all 
aircraft should be replaced on a yearly basis in order to provide sufficient orders for the firms 
to not only retain their skilled labour workforce but also their design teams that were the 
ultimate key to their long-term viability.25 Basing his assumptions on a five-year production 
plan, Charlton began to sketch out a peace-time production scheme that would enable the 
aviation industry to expand if and when necessary to meet the increased demand. The 
production plan was based around the need to build 25,000 aircraft and 30,000 aero-engines 
in the first twelve months of an emergency.26 The need to prepare for an emergency was 
brought home to the Air Ministry through a realisation of the unfavourable strategic situation 
which they faced in the air in comparison to their closest potential enemy. The French Air 
Force, in the early 1920s was the largest in the world and posed a direct theoretical threat to 
London and other major British cities. This had a sobering effect on the government of the 
day, who initiated a 52-squadron construction programme not to defend the UK but to carry 
out equally heavy attacks on enemy centres of gravity such as industrial areas and cities.27 
This reflected the relative focus of the RAF for offensive operations. Although never 
ultimately realised, it quickly became clear that the aviation industry was incapable of 
producing the numbers required to meet the demand for an increased air force. 
This realisation was one of the driving factors behind Charlton’s investigations to discover 
what the potential capacity of the industry would be in the event of an emergency. Two 
questionnaires were sent out to the various manufacturing firms. The first set out to establish 
current production levels and capacity for extra work in peace-time and the second how 
quickly they would be able to expand and how much they would be able to produce in a time 
of national crisis. The firms were, naturally enough, reluctant to provide the information to 
the second questionnaire, mostly out of fear that if they over-estimated their figures this 
would be used as a stick with which to beat them if an emergency did arise. The firms were 
also instructed that their plans for expansion of premises and plant should be made on the 
basis that, in an emergency situation, they would receive financial support from the 
government.28 The problems that they anticipated regarding access to sufficient raw materials 
and the availability of skilled labour were the very real conundrums faced subsequently 
implementing rearmament schemes between 1936 and 1939. Despite the efforts of Charlton 
to explain that they should base their figures on a plentiful supply of raw materials and skilled 
labour, the firms remained intractable. Firms with experience of production in the First World 
War and the massive increases in production required to support the Royal Flying Corps, 
Royal Naval Air Service and RAF were fully aware that no guarantees could be made for 
either of these elements and felt that they would still lay themselves open to public 
criticism.29  
The SBAC did show a degree of flexibility in trying to make themselves better prepared for 
expansion in an emergency, but it would come at a price to the Air Ministry. It was suggested 
that in order to achieve the possible position, the Air Ministry should be ordering a minimum 
of 5 per cent of the 25,000 aircraft that it was estimated would be required.30 This could be 
spread throughout the whole industry. Although, as Sebastian Ritchie has rightly 
acknowledged, this would not have closed the enormous gulf between what the Air Ministry 
believed was required in an emergency and the industry’s ability to meet that demand in the 
first twelve months of an emergency or state of war, it would have provided key indicators to 
further quantify industry shortfalls.31   
Charlton believed that a five-year production plan would give the Air Ministry two main 
advantages. The first was that the individual firms would now be given licence to invest in 
tools and jigs on a larger scale, knowing that they would see a return on their investment and 
more. This would reduce the cost of individual aircraft and give the firms themselves the vital 
experience of limited but important mass production techniques that would ease the transition 
from piece work when required.32 The second was that firms would be more likely to increase 
their production of all-metal aircraft. This was a very recent development in the mid-1920s 
and very few firms had made the transition from wood, string and canvas aircraft.33 All-metal 
aircraft would constitute the key technological development in aircraft construction in the 
inter-war period. 
Without detailed feedback and figures from the industry, however, Charlton would not be in a 
position to develop an outline scheme that optimised both the process and rate of industrial 
expansion. In order to achieve this, and make the transition from peace to war time 
production as seamless as possible, Charlton proposed that ‘Any aircraft or engine finding a 
place on it [the production programme] should alone be produced during peace and on the 
outbreak of war should go, immediately, into quantity production.’34 In doing so, he 
demonstrated an awareness of industrial concerns. In the initial stages of the expansion, the 
aircraft constructors would be faced with enough challenges and anticipated a marked drop in 
production whilst they re-organised, without the added difficulty of having firms produce 
aircraft that they were unfamiliar with. 
There were also decisions to be made regarding how far governments contracts should be 
spread amongst the varying quality of manufacturers that made up the industry.35 
Concentrating orders within a few proven firms would leave them in a healthier financial 
position and able to retain both their production and design staffs.36 It would, however, come 
at the cost of reducing the overall size of the industry as the lesser manufacturers found 
themselves either made insolvent or bought out by the larger firms. In an attempt to prevent 
this happening, a smaller production scheme, to be instituted when a new aircraft was first 
being built, was proposed to allow the Air Ministry to spread peace-time work amongst 
various firms in order to allow them to gain the necessary experience required to increase 
their capacity as well as that of the whole industry. In this scheme, the first six to nine 
machines produced would then be subject to service tests. Following this, the next machine 
(the seventh or the tenth depending on the order) would then be constructed according to the 
Master Tracings that had previously been prepared. The ownership of the Master Tracings 
would pass to the Air Ministry but would remain in the possession of the designing firm for 
updates and corrections. The Master Tracings would then be used to create blueprints that 
could be assigned to different manufacturers on a sub-contract basis.37 This idea was again 
met with a degree of disdain from the SBAC, as was nearly every attempt by the Air Ministry 
to increase the amount of sub-contracting that took place between firms. They saw this as an 
attempt to artificially keep the industry larger than could be supported by current demand and 
were extremely unhappy at work being taken away from reliable firms whose design teams 
had produced superior aircraft. This attitude from the SBAC is understandable from an 
industrial body point of view but it failed to grasp that for wider politico-strategic reasons the 
Air Ministry was needed to enhance the abilities of as many manufacturers as possible. 
Certain areas of the Air Ministry, particularly those connected with supply understood, as 
early as the mid-1920s that the next conflict would be industry- and resource-centric relying 
on economic power for survival and eventual victory. The SBAC was unable to see past the 
balance sheet for the current financial year. 
The eventual plans for an expanded aviation industry in Britain during a period of emergency 
or, indeed, war, were similar to those that would be instigated during rearmament in the mid- 
to late-1930s. There were two distinct phases envisioned for the ultimate expansion of the 
aviation industry after the full expansion of those already supplying and bidding for 
production contracts with the Air Ministry. Outram noted that ‘… each designing firm 
[Master Firm] in an emergency would have certain geographically convenient other Works 
allotted to it, who would construct and supply to the parent firm components, details and 
other units.’38 The Master Firm would remain responsible for the final completed aircraft. 
This would entail that the jigs and machine tools necessary for the manufacture of various 
aircraft parts would have to be spread far and wide according to need, and it was not clear 
where the cost for this would fall. Given the general attitude of the SBAC firms, it is highly 
unlikely that they would be willing to invest in the necessary outlay and infrastructure if they 
were unable to utilise it for themselves. The legal ownership of these important items, as well 
as their maintenance and repair would likely be a further sticking point between the SBAC 
and Air Ministry had this scheme been implemented. The final stage of the proposed 
expansion of the aviation industry would be the creation of so-called National Factories.39 
These would go on to be called the Shadow Factories of the rearmament period and would 
operate in a similar fashion, drawing in firms that were not involved in aviation to expand the 
capacity available to the Air Ministry.  
Ultimately, these plans never had to be put into action as a major diplomatic emergency did 
not occur in the 1920s and the Air Ministry was able to ensure the survival of the aviation 
industry through the farming out of limited existing and forthcoming orders to a select group 
of firms that, they hoped, would provide the physical and intellectual foundations for 
expansion. This, however, was one of the first examples of a military Service looking to 
anticipate requiring extra capacity within an industry and looking to implement plans to 
increase this. Capacity studies and explorations are now standard practice within 
manufacturing and the work of Charlton can provide guidance and direction when working 
with third tier producers. Many of the issues that Charlton encountered in dealing with the 
SBAC, whose major concern was for their members short-term future rather than the long-
term security of the nation, re-emerged during the rearmament period in the 1930s. Aviation 
firms were loath to invest in either the Shadow Factory scheme or in expanded premises and 
tools, jigs and extra staff for what could be a very short-lived rearmament drive. During his 
time as PSO, Charlton sought to work as best he could with the SBAC but almost continually 
met with a wall of defiance that looked to protect profits over national security. The SBAC 
tried to exploit the Air Ministry’s concerns over the preparedness of the aviation industry for 
expansion in order to improve the health of their individual businesses and underlying 
industrial stability. Whilst the survival of the industry as a whole was important to national 
security and strategy, its ability to expand rapidly when required was of greater importance 
still because, as the events of the next decade revealed, whilst it could be kept alive when 
demand was low, large-scale expansion of the aviation industry represented a complex and 
enduring challenge. The Air Ministry and SBAC approached the problem of expansion in the 
aviation from tow completely different perspectives: the industry was looking to the short-
term to ensure their survival, whereas the Air Ministry were sought to protect and enhance 
the security of the nation as a whole. 
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